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resevo Valley gained international 
attention mostly due to the 
insurgency of local Albanians in 
2000, which was also a key factor 
destabilising Macedonia in 2001. Situated 
in southern Serbia and bordering on 
Macedonia and Kosovo, Presevo Valley is 
home to Serbia’s Albanian minority. 
Although the Valley has been calm in the 
last few years and the resurgence of armed 
conflict is unlikely at the moment, the 
situation is still fragile and continues to 
pose a potential security threat for the wider 
region. As the solution to Kosovo’s status is 
approaching, the problems of Albanians in Presevo 
Valley deserve serious attention. There are two 
main sources of security threats: one is the potential 
influx of Serbian refugees, the other is Kosovo’s 
(hypothetical) partition. The latter could potentially 
lead to the outbreak of violence, as Albanians of the 
Valley recently declared their intention to be united 
with Kosovo if the Serbian villages in the North of 
Kosovo would join Serbia. This Policy Brief argues, 
however, that the Serbian government could reduce 
the chances of conflict by addressing some everyday 
problems faced by the Albanian minority, which 
could take the wind out of the sails of potential 
irredentists. Albanian grievances centre on issues 
such as their weak presence in the public sector, 
high unemployment, limited implementation of their 
language rights and the lack of economic 
development. Some of these problems could be 
effectively addressed through strengthening local 
autonomy, which could be part of the solution. It is 
argued here that continuation with the Covic plan, 
which combines decentralisation and 
demilitarisation, could bring about the desired 
stability for the region, which needs continued 
attention and assistance from international bodies, 
among them the European Union. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
In May 2001, the 17-month insurgency of Albanians 
in Southern Serbia came to an end. In the Konculj 
Agreement, Albanians agreed to disarm and disband 
the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 
Bujanovac (UCPMB) in exchange for the promise of 
amnesty for their fighters, the return of refugees, the 
creation of a multi-ethnic police force and the 
integration of Albanians into public institutions. After 
decades of official discrimination and exclusion from 
state institutions, the adoption of the Covic Plan, 
which foresaw the goals mentioned above, provided 
an opportunity to respond to Albanian grievances and 
win loyalty of the Albanian minority to the Serbian 
state. The plan drawn up by Nebojsa Covic, Deputy 
Prime Minister of Serbia in 2001, contained clear 
goals with deadlines, including “the integration of 
Albanians into the political, government and social 
system”, meaning into the police, judiciary, health 
services, education, municipal institutions, economy, 
etc. in proportion to their numbers.
1 
During the Milosevic era, both during and after the 
Kosovo conflict, Albanians in southern Serbia were 
subjected to police harassment, including torture and 
execution of civilians, which was the main 
motivation for forming the UCPMB and igniting an 
armed conflict in the Valley. During the fighting, 
which lasted around a year and a half, about 100 
people were killed and as a result 12,500 Albanians 
left the area. Since the fighting ended, around 10,000 
people have returned and the situation has 
significantly improved. One of the greatest successes 
has been the creation of the multi-ethnic police force 
with the help of OSCE (Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe). In July 2002, local elections 
                                                  
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Southern Serbia: In 
Kosovo’s Shadow”, Policy Briefing No. 43, 
Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels, 27 June 2006, p. 3. 
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were held which brought Albanian parties to power 
in local municipal assemblies.  
Local Albanians mostly support moderate parties; 
thus the resurgence of armed conflict is quite unlikely 
– although in 2002 and 2003, small-scale incidents 
continued. Nevertheless, the situation is still fragile 
and still poses a potential security threat for the wider 
region. The 2001 conflict in Macedonia was due to a 
spill-over from southern Serbia (see on map1 and 2), 
and nobody knows how Kosovo’s independence 
would affect the delicate situation in the Valley. 
Certainly goodwill on behalf of the Serbian 
government is needed to make local Albanians feel 
like equal citizens of the Serbian state. The lack of 
economic and social development, coupled with high 
numbers of Serbian security forces stationed in the 
Valley, does not foster mutual trust and stability. 
Moreover, Albanians are becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with their political moderates who, during 
the last political term, cooperated with Covic and 
Belgrade, yet delivered no results in terms of 
economic development and integration of Albanians 
into public institutions.  
As a solution to Kosovo’s status is approaching, the 
problems of Albanians in Presevo Valley deserve 
serious attention. The international community, 
especially OSCE, NATO, UNDP and other non-
governmental and multilateral organisations, has 
played a crucial role in preserving peace, 
reconstruction and refugee return so far. Continuation 
with the Covic plan, decentralisation and 
demilitarisation together could bring about the 
desired stability for the region, which needs 
continued attention and assistance of international 
bodies, among them the European Union.
2  
The next section highlights the main problems the 
Albanian minority is facing today in Serbia, a 
significant portion of which could be effectively 
addressed through further empowering of municipal 
self-governments. It will be argued here that 
decentralisation coupled with demilitarisation and 
integration could mean a real solution to most of their 
grievances, which could ease tensions and bring 
lasting stability in the Valley, even if Kosovo goes 
independent. 
2.  The drawbacks of the current 
administrative organisation 
Presevo Valley, a regional home to Serbia’s largest 
Albanian minority, is situated in southern Serbia 
bordering Macedonia to the south and Kosovo to the 
west (see on map1 and 2).  The municipalities of 
Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja are part of the 
Pcinje district with its centre in Vranje. The total 
population of the Valley is around 86,000 inhabitants, 
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of whom around 57,000 are Albanians and the rest 
are Serbs and Roma. Presevo has an Albanian 
majority of 89% of the people. Bujanovac’s 
population is split among the three ethnic groups, 
where Albanians constitute the majority (54%), 
although Serbs (34%) and Roma (9%) also live in 
considerable numbers. Medvedja is the only Serb 
majority municipality of the Valley, where Serbs 
constitute 66% of the population and Albanians 36%. 
Altogether Albanians contribute to around 25% of the 
Pcinje district population, yet the regional 
administrative centre in Vranje is dominated by 
Serbs, where the Serbian Radical Party and Serbian 
Socialist Party enjoy the most popular support. The 
local parties and their policies are often openly anti-
Albanian and the court system is infamously corrupt.
3 
Albanians especially feel excluded from district-level 
administration, having no representative at the 
district-level court or in other institutions.  
Whereas current administrative arrangements do not 
favour Albanians, some proposals for future 
regionalisation of Serbia could lead to even worse 
solutions, providing opportunities for ethnic 
gerrymandering. According to Kostunica’s DSS 
proposal, Serbia should be organised into six regions, 
among which Presevo Valley’s three municipalities 
would be added to a bigger region with its centre in 
Nis, instead of Vranje. Such a solution would mean 
that the proportion of Albanians in such a region 
would diminish to about 4%, further reducing their 
chances for effective political participation.
4 
Albanians would prefer either to abolish the present 
district-level administration and delegate its functions 
to the municipalities or to create a Presevo district 
made up by the three municipalities of Presevo, 
Bujanovac and Medvedja.
5 
Altogether, the lack of local autonomy in various 
fields has numerous negative consequences for local 
Albanians, such as their weak presence in the public 
sector, high unemployment, limited implementation 
of their language rights and the lack of economic 
development. These issues are explored in the 
following section. 
3.  Central control and its implications 
Under-representation in the public 
sector  
In those municipalities where national minorities 
constitute a majority, it is a crucial question who 
appoints local police chiefs, staff and personnel of the 
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4 Interview with Shaip Kamberi, Council for Human 
Rights, 19 September 2006, Bujanovac. 
5 Ibid.  
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local courts. At present municipal local authorities 
have no control over local courts and police; all 
employees of these bodies are appointed by Belgrade. 
It is true in general, however, that Albanians are 
barely represented in all institutions under central 
control (such as the post office, tax authorities, land 
registry, local development offices, social 
institutions, health centres, customs services, 
different inspection bodies such as state financial, 
market, sanitary and labour inspections, and among 
principals of primary and secondary schools). In 
socially-owned companies, most of which are still 
waiting to be privatised, the situation is the same: the 
majority of employees are also of Serbian ethnicity. 
For instance, in the company called Heba, which is a 
producer of mineral water and one of the few 
profitable companies in the region, 95% of the 
workers are Serbs.  
At the Bujanovac municipal court, only 4 out of 44 
employees are Albanians and the rest are Serbs. At 
the municipal court in Presevo, 11 out of 40 
employees are Albanians, 3 Roma and 24 are Serbs. 
The public prosecution department in Bujanovac has 
8 employees, 7 Serbs and 1 Albanian who is a deputy 
prosecutor. In the same body in Presevo, there are 10 
employees, 5 Serbs and 5 Albanians. The Health 
Centre in Bujanovac has 272 employees, of which 
212 are Serbs, 57 Albanians and 3 Roma. The Health 
Centre in Presevo has 169 employees, 126 Albanians 
and 43 Serbs.
6 
The police force is an exception in this regard since 
the establishment of the multi-ethnic force, which 
incorporated many Albanians into its ranks. 
Unemployment 
Unemployment is a serious problem not only because 
Albanians have a hard time feeling like equal citizens 
of Serbia due to their under-representation in public 
institutions, but also because unemployment in the 
region is a grave issue, even for the Serbian 
population. Employment in the public sector can 
grant some level of social stability under such severe 
economic circumstances. In Bujanvac the rate of 
unemployment is estimated around 60%, and in 
Presevo around 70%. After five years of the adoption 
of the Covic plan which foresaw the integration of 
Albanians into state institutions, it can be concluded 
that, except for the multi-ethnic local police, 
integration has been very slow, if at all, in all 
institutions controlled by the central state. Since 
Albanians have been essentially excluded from the 
public sector, they were forced to open small 
businesses, or work abroad and help their families 
through remittances. According to the ICG, the 
greatest long-term security challenge is to address the 
                                                  
6 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, 
Annual Report 2004, p. 6. 
unemployment of the young male population, many 
of whom are former UPCMP fighters.
7 
At the same time, cross-border smuggling is 
flourishing in the area, and not only Albanians, but 
Serb authorities and police, and Serb organised crime 
are involved in illegal businesses.
8 
Obstacles impeding official language use 
Partially as a consequence of employment practices, 
the official use of Albanian in Bujanovac and 
Presevo is lacking in many areas due to the shortage 
of Albanian-speaking staff. In Bujanovac, in the local 
court out of eight judges only one is Albanian; 
therefore the official use of Albanian exists mainly 
on paper, except in the municipal administration. 
Since Albanian parties took control of the local 
governments in Presevo and Bujanovac, the 
communication with local authorities and 
administration can be conducted in Albanian. In 
principle, Albanian became an official language in 
Bujanovac and Presevo in 2002, when the law on 
national minorities was adopted at the federal level, 
which enabled municipal local governments to 
recognise minority languages as official next to 
Serbian. Besides the lack of Albanian-speaking staff, 
however, legal loopholes also hinder the official use 
of Albanian. The act on the official use of language 
foresees the issuing of bilingual official documents 
and empowers the minister to order the issuing of 
such documents. In Vojvodina, for instance, the 
provincial bodies have the authority to order the 
printing of bilingual birth certificates in all minority 
languages that are in official use on the territory of 
Vojvodina. Yet, outside of Vojvodina, in the rest of 
Serbia, if the relevant ministry fails to deliver these 
bilingual documents, local governments cannot do 
much about it.
9 Clearly, in the absence of bilingual 
documents, the official use of Albanian cannot be 
practiced in reality. The fact that Albanian cannot be 
used in practice in many spheres of communication 
has also a gender aspect. It is especially a problem for 
Albanian women and children who often know very 
little Serbian, while the men in general have a good 
command of Serbian.
10 
It can be assumed that if local governments had 
authority over the institutions
11 that are currently 
                                                  
7 ICG, “Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace”, ICG Europe 
Report No. 152, 9 December 2003, p. 15. 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 Interview with János Orosz, Novi Sad, 25 September 
2006. 
10 Interview with Shaip Kamberi. 
11 These are: post office, tax authorities, land registry, 
local development offices, social institutions, health 
centres, customs services and various inspection organs 
such as state financial, market, sanitary and labour 
inspections.  
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under central state control, the integration of 
Albanians into those institutions would accelerate. It 
would not only improve their employment situation, 
but as a positive side effect it would provide the 
opportunity to implement the official use of Albanian 
more widely. Nevertheless, in general, responsibility 
would lie more with local authorities for fulfilling the 
need for integration and official language use of 
Albanian, and the Serbian state would be less easily 
blamed for the lack of progress. One solution could 
be the delegation of these functions to municipal 
local governments, while the state could still sustain 
its control over the lawfulness and appropriateness of 
the conduct of these functions. At the same time, 
local authorities could have an influence over 
employment practices in these institutions, as is the 
case in Macedonia. If the Serbian state insists on 
maintaining the district-level administration system, 
then it should be a priority to achieve proportionate 
representation of Albanians and other minorities in 
these institutions. It would be also desirable to define 
districts corresponding to the needs of national 
minorities; in this case, the three municipalities of 
Presevo Valley could constitute one single district.  
However, full implementation of language rights 
would require further action by the state, besides 
decentralisation. Since Serbia’s framework law on 
national minorities grants far-reaching rights to 
minorities in this regard, the Serbian government 
should address the legal inconsistencies and other 
obstacles that impede the practical implementation of 
existing minority rights, such as the issuing of 
bilingual documents. 
Economic situation 
Presevo Valley has been traditionally an 
economically neglected region in Serbia, with per 
capita income of less than one-third the Serbian 
average. In the last few years international donors 
have invested a lot of money in the local 
infrastructure, while the Serbian government gave 
most funding to the municipality of Medvedja, which 
is the only Serb-majority area in the Valley. This 
kind of investment policy of the state not only makes 
Albanians feel like second-class citizens of Serbia, 
but also remains a continued source of 
disappointment and instability.
12 
Privatisation has been marked by corruption and 
cronyism, and allegedly it has been much politicised. 
Municipal local governments have been left out of 
the process, and Serbs took control of lucrative firms 
with the help of the centrally-controlled Privatisation 
Agency. According to local analysts, Albanians do 
not have equal chances to purchase companies.
13 In 
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13 Such a case was the privatisation of Balkan Brick 
factory from Vladicin Han. The municipality of 
general the whole process has been lagging behind, 
and as most companies are not profitable, they are 
therefore hard to sell. While in other parts of Serbia 
most firms have been sold already, in Presevo Valley 
very few companies have been privatised since 2001.  
At the same time, local municipal governments do 
not have many tools at their disposal to attract 
investment. They can offer breaks from local taxes, 
yet they cannot offer property for investors, since all 
public property is owned by the state. Therefore, 
increasing the role of local governments in local 
economic development, which would above all 
require the devolution of property to municipalities, 
would be crucial in order to revitalise these local 
economies. Nevertheless, as long as Kosovo remains 
in a legal limbo, southern Serbia will not be 
perceived as a stable environment, and investors will 
probably keep away. 
4.  Other corrective measures needed 
Besides the problems discussed above, which can be 
fully or partially associated with the lack of sufficient 
local autonomy, there are further concerns that could 
be addressed through means other than 
decentralisation. Such issues are related to education, 
refugee return and the presence of armed forces in the 
Valley that keep fuelling resentment among the local 
population. 
Education 
Presevo has eight Albanian primary schools, one 
Serbian and a mixed high school. Bujanovac has six 
primary schools and one high school, two of which 
are Serbian.
14 For Albanians the biggest problem is 
posed by parts of the curricula, especially history 
containing humiliating ethnic content.
15 
As most students study in Kosovo, the recognition of 
Kosovar diplomas is a crucial issue for Albanians. A 
peculiar situation emerged in which diplomas 
received at Kosovar universities are accepted in 
practice since 2003, yet there has been no official 
decision in terms of legislation in Serbia. The use of 
textbooks brought from Kosovo is allowed in 
practice, yet the curricula have not been harmonised 
with Serbian curricula. Moreover, which particular 
                                                                             
Vladicin Han and the BIA put political pressure on the 
Agency for Privatisation to annul the auction, because 
Nexhat Beluli, an Albanian businessman from 
Bujanovac, wanted to buy it. The BIA suggested to the 
Agency for Privatisation that the deal should be 
cancelled since an ‘UCPMB terrorist’ bought the 
company. Source: Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human 
Rights, Bujanoc, Annual Report 2004, p. 9. 
14 ICG Report, 2003, op. cit., p. 21. 
15 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, 
Annual Report 2004, p. 5.  
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books will be approved depends on ad hoc decisions 
of civil servants in Belgrade. On the whole, due to 
the lack of official regulation, the recognition of 
diplomas and permitting the use of textbooks depend 
on the goodwill of the central authorities. This is not 
an ideal solution, since it keeps the Albanian minority 
vulnerable to the political mood of the central 
government.
16 The adoption of some kind of legal 
measure on behalf of the Serbian government would 
be needed to settle the problem of diplomas and 
textbooks received from Kosovo.  
Refugee return 
Another grievance of local Albanians is the fact that 
many who fled the area to Kosovo during the conflict 
in 2000 cannot return. They cannot go back either 
because UNMIK papers are not recognised in Serbia 
or because most of the houses that were destroyed 
during the conflict have not been rebuilt. Around 
3,000 people from Bujanovac live as IDPs (internally 
displaced persons) in Kosovo currently, most of them 
in Gjilanje.
17 Most of them fled from the 5 kilometre-
wide ground safety zone in the Bujanovac highlands 
(see on map1), where their houses were either 
destroyed or were simply demolished after they were 
deserted by their inhabitants. Not only the policies of 
Milosevic, but economic hardships also prompted 
mass emigration to Kosovo and to Western Europe, 
which was also characteristic of other minority 
communities in Serbia, such as the Hungarians.  
Serbia’s loss of its authority in Kosovo, which led to 
the erection of a de facto international border 
between Kosovo and Serbia, hit the Albanians in 
Presevo Valley especially hard, making the 
movement of people across the borders extremely 
difficult. In the former Yugoslavia, there were no 
borders between Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, and 
Albanians living along these three borders fostered 
intense social links with each other. 
A recent report commissioned by Freedom House
18 
urged the Serbian and the Kosovar governments, to 
improve economic ties and free movement of people 
along the Serbian-Kosovar border with the assistance 
of the European Union, which would require a 
change in trade and visa regimes in both 
countries/entities. Admittedly, the report was inspired 
                                                  
16 Interview with Shaip Kamberi, Council for Human 
Rights, 19 September 2006, Bujanovac.  
17 Interview with Emrullah Muftiu, chief of 
administration in Bujanovac municipal government, 19 
September 2006. 
18 A Joint European Vision: Free Movement for Goods 
and People in Kosovo and Serbia, report published 
jointly by Freedom House, European Movement in 
Serbia, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and 
Development. (see http://www.otvoreno.org.yu/ 
dokumenti/emins_eng.pdf). 
by fears that the Western Balkans “risks becoming a 
ghetto consisting of ghettos”, meaning that the region 
becomes isolated from the rest of Europe, and that 
the countries of the region become isolated from each 
other as well. Another aspect of this problem, 
however, which was not mentioned by the report, is 
that the Albanian population living on both sides of 
the Serbian-Kosovar border and the Serbian minority 
living in Kosovo would especially need the 
improvement of trade and visa regimes between 
Kosovo and Serbia. Since the interests seem to be 
mutual, here the same proposals can be presented, 
only in a different context. Taking the interests of the 
Albanian and the Serbian minorities into 
consideration, trade and visa regimes should be 
placed at the top of the negotiations agenda between 
Serbia and Kosovo.  
Security forces 
The establishment of the multi-ethnic police force 
with the assistance of OSCE can be regarded as a real 
success. In the municipal police in Bujanovac, for 
instance, the chief of police is a Serb, but one of his 
deputies is an Albanian. Yet, at the district-level, 
which has its centre in Vranje and includes seven 
municipalities, 25% of which is Albanian, Albanians 
are not represented at all.  
However, essential policing power, with the right of 
carrying out searches and arrests still lies with the 
Gendarmerie, which is a special police body 
incorporating former members of the Serbian state 
security. The presence of the Gendarmerie is very 
intimidating for local Albanians, as they drive around 
in the villages brandishing their machine guns in a 
demonstration of force. Their active operation in a 5-
kilometer-wide border zone with Kosovo and 
Macedonia (see on map1) prevents the free 
movement of people within the area and the use of 
land. Local Albanians would prefer the buffer zone to 
be reduced to 300 meters instead of 5 kilometres.
19  
Construction of a new army base for the Gendarmerie 
recently began near Bujanovac, but the construction 
works stopped, probably due to the lack of funding. 
Besides the Gendarmerie, the army and the multi-
ethnic police are the security bodies active in Presevo 
Valley. Certainly the deployment of special forces in 
such high numbers in the area does suggest that the 
state relates to this population as a potential enemy, 
and such an attitude certainly does not help to build 
trust and stability in the region. Therefore, one of the 
highest priorities for Albanian politicians is the 
demilitarisation of southern Serbia. Moreover, 
although the multi-ethnic police has been created, its 
authority is limited compared to that of the 
Gendarmerie. Albanian politicians would prefer the 
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local multi-ethnic police to guard the borders and for 
ethnic Albanians to be incorporated into border 
police bodies and custom services, which currently 
do not employ Albanians.
20 
Serbian media also contribute to the maintenance of 
distrust and tensions between Serbs and Albanians. 
Albanians are most often portrayed as ‘Islamic 
terrorists’ and smugglers, and are overwhelmingly 
presented in a negative light.
21  
5.  Local Albanian politics 
The issues explored above have to be addressed in 
the context of local politics. Interestingly, the 
Albanian minority is among the few in Serbia that 
has not formed its own national council. It is an 
important fact, because according to the law on 
national minorities, national councils are the bodies 
through which cultural autonomy can be realised in 
Serbia. That they have failed to set up their national 
council is telling about their attitude towards the 
Serbian state and also about their internal political 
dynamics.  
Part of the reason might be that forming their council 
would imply acceptance of the fact that their country 
is Serbia. However, this kind of attitude seems to be 
changing, as evidenced by the Albanian parties’ 
decision to participate in the recent parliamentary 
elections in January 2007. This is a big development, 
taking into account that they have boycotted all 
national election over the last 15 years.  
The other reason why Albanian parties failed to form 
their national council was due to disagreements about 
who should be its leader. The strongest party is the 
moderate Party for Democratic Action (PDD) led by 
Riza Halimi. Recently, however, PDD lost its leading 
influence in Presevo’s local government. In the three 
municipalities of the Valley, Albanian parties 
together control 66 seats in local assemblies, out of 
which 34 belongs to PDD. The other Albanian parties 
do not want PDD to dominate the national council, 
which would be inevitable due to its numerical 
majority. The failure to set up the Albanian National 
Council often serves as an excuse for Serbian 
authorities as to why many Albanian national 
minority rights, such as official language use, are not 
implemented in practice. Nevertheless, forming their 
national council would be the minimum Albanians 
could do to assert their minority rights. Given their 
unwillingness to create their national council, it is 
somewhat strange to put all the blame on Belgrade 
for the lack of progress. 
                                                  
20 Interview with Ragmi Mustafa, mayor of Presevo, 19 
September 2006, Presevo. 
21 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, 
Annual Report 2004, p. 7. 
PDD, which is still the most popular among Albanian 
voters, represents a moderate political option, 
fighting for the rights of Albanians in the Serbian 
state. Its leader, Riza Halimi, has been the chief 
negotiator with Belgrade and the international 
community. 
During the last local elections in June 2004 in 
Presevo, the PDD failed to win the majority in the 
local assembly. The coalition of other Albanian 
parties – consisting of the Party for Democratic 
Progress (LDP), the Democratic Party of Albanians 
(PDSH) and the Democratic Union of the Valley 
(BDL) – worked together to remove the PDD mayor 
and replaced him in 2005 with Ragmi Mustafa, leader 
of the PDSH. The PDSH is a nationalist party 
advocating the unification of Albanian-inhabited 
regions in Macedonia and Southern Serbia with 
Kosovo and is closely linked to former UPCMB 
commanders.
22 According to analysts, the take-over 
by the PDSH in Presevo is not a sign of radicalisation 
of local Albanians, but indicates that people got tired 
of Halimi’s politics, which delivered no progress in 
terms of economic development, but were marked by 
much corruption. The low turnout of 21% during the 
June 2006 mayoral elections (when Mustafa’s 
position as mayor was confirmed) also suggest that 
Halimi’s call for a boycott was successful, and the 
moderate political option is still popular among 
people.
23 
In Bujanovac, Albanian parties received 22 seats out 
of 44 in the local assembly (PDD 13, LDP 9), while 
Serbs received 17 mandates (SRS 12, DOS coalition 
5). The incumbent mayor, Nagip Arifi, the PDD 
candidate, won the mayoral election. In Medvedja, 
Albanian parties won only 7 seats. A local citizens’ 
group’s representative won the race for mayor.
24 
It should be stressed that most Albanian voters, not 
only in Serbia but also in Macedonia, favour 
moderates. The recent local elections in Presevo 
represent the first time a radical Albanian party 
promoting unification with Kosovo came out as 
strongest and could form the ruling coalition.
25 As 
was noted above, however, this vote was probably 
more an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
previous mayor, Riza Halimi, than a sign of 
radicalisation. The Kosovar Albanian leadership also 
tries to keep tensions low in Presevo Valley, which 
also does not favour extremists. 
                                                  
22 ICG Report 2003, op. cit., p. 19. 
23 ICG Report 2006, op. cit, pp. 8-10. See same source 
for more on local politics. 
24 ICG Report 2006, op. cit., p. 10. 
25 Such as the ICG.  
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6.  The Kosovo factor 
Despite that fact that a radical mayor took over the 
office in Presevo, the security situation seems quite 
stable at the moment. Yet no one knows what will 
happen if Kosovo gains its independence. It is very 
unlikely that the Albanians in Presevo Valley would 
want to take up arms to join an independent Kosovo 
within its present borders. Admittedly Albanians in 
Presevo Valley would be both happy and sad if their 
ethnic kin were to gain full independence – happy 
about Kosovo having gained its freedom from Serbia 
and sad because they cannot participate in the new 
state. Yet, they emphasise that if Kosovo becomes 
independent, it would not trigger irredentist 
aspirations in the Valley. According to the 
International Crisis Group, Albanian leaders in 
Pristina are encouraging their ethnic kin in Presevo 
Valley to accept the fact that their country is Serbia, 
since any conflict in southern Serbia might disturb 
Kosovo’s drive towards independence.
26 
Nevertheless, Kosovo’s independence could still 
cause trouble on Serbia’s southern borders. There are 
two main sources from which security threats can 
emanate: one is the potential influx of Serbian 
refugees, the other is Kosovo’s partition. While the 
first could be dealt with if there was sufficient 
political will in Serbia and help from the international 
community, the second represents a trickier 
challenge. 
Tensions could still escalate, if for instance Kosovo’s 
independence would prompt a large influx of Serbian 
refugees from Kosovo to Southern Serbia, tipping the 
delicate ethnic balance in the region. Already around 
3,500 Serbian refugees live in the area near 
Bujanovac. The arrival of Serbs fleeing from Kosovo 
might be especially dangerous, since ethnic tolerance 
can hardly be expected from people who just lost 
their homes in Kosovo and are ready to take revenge. 
The presence of the Gendarmerie and its possible 
reaction to potential unrest is a matter of concern as 
well. Therefore it is very important that authorities 
prepare for such a scenario and establish refugee 
camps outside of the Albanian-inhabited areas.  
Conflict could also break out if Kosovo does not keep 
its present borders, in the event that some Serbian 
villages in northern Kosovo are joined to Serbia. 
Although the international community appears to be 
firmly against such a redrawing of borders, as 
reflected by the Contact Group’s position, northern 
Mitrovica is essentially run by Serbian authorities 
and linked to Serbia’s infrastructure. Most functions, 
including health care, schools, water supply and 
telephone services, are controlled by Serbia, hence 
the area is de facto under Serbian authority.
27 If this 
                                                  
26 ICG Report 2006, op. cit., p. 8. 
27 Interiew with James Lyon, Director of International 
Crisis Group, Belgrade, 26 September 2006. 
control gains international recognition that could lead 
to the renewal of armed conflict in Presevo Valley. 
The Albanians will demand the three municipalities 
of Presevo Valley to be united with Kosovo in 
exchange for northern Mitrovica, Zevcan, Zubin 
Potok and Leposavic. In fact, the Albanian 
councillors of the municipalities of Presevo, 
Bujanovac and Medvedja adopted a common 
political platform in January 2006 in which they 
“commit to unification of Presevo Valley with 
Kosovo in case of … possible change of Kosovo 
borders.”
28  
However, the councillors raised a list of other 
demands in the platform as well, many of which are 
related to aspirations of the Covic plan. Addressing 
them has been a long overdue task of the Serbian 
state, such as the proportional integration of 
Albanians in all state and public institutions. The 
platform also mentions the need for decentralisation, 
foreseeing some kind territorial autonomy for 
Presevo Valley. The platform maintains that the 
Valley “should have a form of administrative-
territorial organisation with functions in the fields of 
the judiciary, police, education, use of language and 
national symbols, health, economic and cultural 
development, local planning, environment, natural 
resources, housing issues and social services”.
29 This 
claim for local autonomy was repeatedly reiterated by 
local Albanian politicians who argue that Albanians 
are due the same rights that the Serbs demand in 
Kosovo; meaning essential decentralisation at the 
municipal level.
30  
Probably any solution implying any kind of territorial 
autonomy or federalisation would be unacceptable to 
the Serbian authorities, yet essential decentralisation 
at the municipal level could be a feasible option. This 
would please not only minorities but all local 
municipalities regardless of ethnicity. 
Decentralisation could also accelerate the integration 
of Albanians into the public sector, and create better 
conditions for the official use of the Albanian 
language.   
7.  Conclusions and recommendations 
Whatever happens with Kosovo, it is very likely that 
developments in the province will have an impact on 
the security situation in southern Serbia. Therefore it 
                                                  
28 Citation from the platform on “Albanian Councilors 
of Presevo Valley (Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja) 
in meeting held on 14 January 2006 in Preshevo.” 
29 Ibid. 
30 Allegedly, Veton Surroi, a Kosovar Albanian member 
of the Vienna negotiations insisted that if Belgrade 
demands more autonomy for the Serbian municipalities 
in Kosovo, it should provide an example of how to do it 
in southern Serbia.  
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would be urgent to address the grievances of the 
Albanian minority in Presevo Valley in an effective 
and credible fashion. The solutions are not hard to 
find, in fact they are ready on the table. Moving on 
with the Covic plan, reducing the presence of the 
Gendarmerie and continuing the decentralisation 
reform started in 2002 could be effective ways to 
reduce ethnic tensions in the Valley and prevent a 
renewed escalation of conflict. Such measures could 
make the Albanians of Presevo Valley feel more like 
equal citizens of, and at home in, Serbia. 
Therefore, the following issues need to be addressed: 
Recommendations to the Serbian 
government 
•  Continue with the decentralisation reform launched in 
2002. The most important next step would be the 
devolution of property to municipal governments. The 
borders and the role of districts should be also 
reconsidered. The present district-level administration 
should be  
-  either abolished and its functions delegated to the 
municipalities or  
-  a new Presevo district should be created, made up by 
the three municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and 
Medvedja.  
•  Legal and other necessary steps should be taken in order 
to guarantee the official use of the Albanian language in 
Presevo Valley, especially in the police and judicial 
bodies, but also in other state institutions. Since the right 
to official language use has been granted to the Albanian 
minority by the Law on Protection of Rights and 
Freedoms of National Minorities,
31 the Serbian state 
should take the necessary action to ensure that the law is 
implemented in practice. 
•  The recognition of diplomas obtained at Kosovo 
universities and the usage of textbooks imported from 
Kosovo should be dealt with through a legal measure and 
not through ad hoc decisions by civil servants in 
Belgrade. 
•  Policing functions should be handed over to the multi-
ethnic police, and the operations of the Gendarmerie 
should be reduced in the Valley in order to establish trust 
between security forces and the local population. 
Recommendations to Albanian 
politicians 
•  In general, Albanian politicians should make the 
best use of the opportunities and institutions that 
are offered to them by law. While Albanians are 
not able to set up their national council, it is 
                                                  
31 Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities, Article 11 [Official Gazette of 
FRY, No. 11 of 27 February 2002]. 
somewhat strange to put all the blame on the 
Serbian state for the lack of implementation of 
their cultural and language rights. 
Recommendations to the Serbian 
government and Albanian politicians 
•  The use of national symbols and the celebration 
of national holidays, which are also due right of 
Albanians according to the law, should be 
allowed.
32 However, in this regard, Albanian 
politicians should respect the stipulation in the 
law according to which “national signs and 
symbols may not be identical to the signs and 
symbols of another state”, and should give up 
insisting on the usage of symbols of the Albanian 
state. 
•  Speeding up the integration of Albanians into the 
public sector should be put high on the agenda, 
as was foreseen originally by the Covic plan. The 
responsibility lies not only with the Serbian 
government, but also with local Albanian 
politicians who should pursue a politics of 
cooperation rather than confrontation. 
Recommendations to the EU and the 
Serbian government 
•  Revitalisation of the local economy would be 
crucial in order to create lasting stability. A 70% 
unemployment rate and a lack of economic 
prospects continue to be serious destabilising 
factors in the region. The international 
community should provide financial and 
technical assistance to Serbia, recognising that 
stabilising the Valley is a regional interest. 
•  Lastly, it should be a priority to adopt trade and 
visa regimes that would make the free movement 
of goods and people across the Serbian-Kosovo 
border easier. This would serve the interests not 
only of southern Serbia’s Albanians, but of 
Kosovo’s Serbian minority as well. 
•  Since any escalation of the conflict in southern 
Serbia might easily spill over not only to Kosovo 
but to Macedonia as well (see Maps 1 and 2), an 
intensified and continuing monitoring of the 
situation on the ground by the international 
community – especially by the EU – and 
increased international political engagement are 
strongly recommended.
33 
                                                  
32 Ibid. 
33 These points were stressed in a recent ICG report on 
southern Serbia as well – see Southern Serbia: In 
Kosovo’s Shadow, Europe Briefing No. 43, ICG, 27 
June 2006 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ 
index.cfm?l=1&id=4184).  
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Map 2. Map of Kosovo with Sandzak and southern Serbia 
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